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Buzhardt: Statutory Construction
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

J. FIED BUZHAPDT,

JR.*

A large part of cases decided during the survey period which hinged
on the construction by the court of statutes was attibutable to the
change in phraseology and grouping of sections incident to codification of the Code of 1952, resulting in a number of novel questions
being decided by the application of long and well established rules of
construction.
In State v. Conally' the defendant was convicted on a plea of guilty
of possession of alcoholic liquors in unstamped containers, second
offense, and was sentenced to eighteen months in prison, from which
sentence the defendant appealed. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Act
of 19452 had limited the punishment of this offense to less than the
sentence imposed, as did an amendment 3 to the act passed in 1951. In
codification the limitation on the sentence for this offense was omitted
in an unambiguously reworded section 4 and the court affirmed this
sentence; reluctantly, however, since they felt that the change was
inadvertent rather than deliberate. Since the act as codified was unambiguous, the court held that they could not refer to the original
act for purposes of construction.
Raggio v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society5 was an
action commenced by the beneficiary, who sought to recover on a life
insurance policy. Defendant asserted in defense that the policy was
void due to material misrepresentations made by the insured in the
application for the policy, to which plaintiff demurred on the ground
that the defendant was limited by statute6 to two years in which to
vacate the policy on the ground of material misrepresentation and
more than two years had passed since the issuance of the policy. The
trial court overruled the demurrer on the ground that Section 37-161,
CODE Ov LAWS OP SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, was inapplicable to fraternal benefit associations, to which group defendant admittedly belonged. On appeal, the Supreme Court, in a split decision, reversed
aMember of the firm of Buzhardt & Buzhardt, McCormick, S. C.; LL.B., University of
South Carolina, 1952.

1. 227 S.C. 507, 88 S.E. 2d 591 (1955).
2. Act No. 221, XLIV Stat. at Large, 337.
3. Act No. 379, XLVII Stat. at Large, 546, 655 (Section 94).
4. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 4-107; See also, CODZ or LAWS
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 17-553.
5. 228 S.C. 340, 90 S.E. 2d 212 (1955).
6. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 37-161.

141

Published by Scholar Commons, 1956

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 21
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9

the trial court's ruling. Section 37-857, CoDe or LAWS Or SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1952, provided that the general insurance laws of the State
shall not apply to fraternal benefit associations, unless express provision therefor is made in any such act. The act 7 containing the two
year limitation was applicable to "all companies", company being
defined at the beginning of the chapter under "definitions" to include
fraternal benefit associations.8 The trial court and the dissenting
opinions of the Supreme Court, strictly construing the statutes, took
the view that Section 37-857 excepted defendant from the limiting
section. The majority opinion, however, after reviewing the history
of the act, held that the codification 9 of the Act of May 12, 1947,
XLV Statute at Large, 322, was a re-grouping and re-phrasing of
the law only and indicated no legislative intent to change the operation of the law.
Section 20-6.1, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952, was construed by the Court in Crawford v. Crawford.10 This section provides in substance that children born of a void marriage, which either
of the contracting parties entered in good faith, shall be deemed to
be legitimate. Plaintiff in this action sought to establish her right
to inherit from her father, who died on November 2, 1952. The codification act, 1 by its express provisions, declares the Code of 1952 "to
be the only general statutory law of the State"12 as of January 8,
1952, but also expressly provided that the act13 shall take effect upon
approval by the Governor, which approval occurred on November
19, 1952. The court was thus faced with the question of whether
the act was applicable where the person from whom it was sought
to inherit died between the two dates. The court, in reaching its
decision, found it unnecessary to decide that the provisions of the
1952 Code did not become effective on January 8, 1952, but upheld
the decision of the Circuit Court by reasoning that the application of
Section 20-6.1 to this case would divest the defendant respondent of
vested rights in property in violation of Article 1, Section 8, Constitution of South Carolina (1895). In addition, the court found that
Section 20-6.1 was ambiguous, in that it used verbs of past, present
and future tense. The ambiguity was solved by reference to the origi7. Supra.

8. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 37-2(3).
9. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Title 37.

10. 228 S.C. 77, 88 S.E. 2d 874 (1955).
11. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 (See inside cover, Vol. I).

12. Supra.
13. Supia.
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nal act, which, by its terms, was not applicable to plaintiff's circumstances.
The case of Bohlen, et al. v. Allen, et al.1 4 was an action to determine who was the legal County Engineer for York County, and presented the question of whether the county engineer could be elected
by a majority of the county governing body and the supervisor, or
whether the governing body and supervisor, as separate entities, had to
agree on a county engineer under the terms of Section 33-1922, Code
of Laws of South Carolina, 1952. To determine the legislative intent,
the court considered the act 15 as a whole as it was phrased 16 prior to
codification, since the particular section under construction was patently ambiguous, and concluded that the supervisor's concurrence was
essential to elect the county engineer.
In Abell v. Bell,17 the question presented was whether the act under construction was mandatory or permissive. The act1 8 concerned
the conveyance of abandoned schools to community trustees by school
trustees and the ambiguity was created by the use of the words, "authorized to convey", in one place and subsequently the words, "shall
be conveyed". In reaching the conclusion that the Legislature intended the act to be mandatory, the court considered the terms of the
entire act as a whole and scrutinized all cognate legislation thoroughly.
The recovery of fees or monies collected by the highway department erroneously or without authority of law was held to be controlled and limited by Section 46-50, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952, by the court in Wilder v. South Carolina State Highway
Department.19 Although Section 33-72, Code of Laws of South
Carolina, 1952, provides "the State Highway Department may enter
into such contracts as may be necessary for the proper discharge of
its functions and duties and may sue and be sued thereon", the court
held that no suit for fees illegally collected could be maintained, since
an exclusive remedy was provided by Section 45-50 by means of a
claim for refund.
In Bagwell v. Ernest Burwell, Inc. 20 the court found Section
75-356, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952, unambiguous, and,
therefore, not subject to construction. The section which the court
14. 228 S.C. 135, 89 S.E. 2d 99 (1955).
15. CoDZ OF LAWs OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 33-1921; § 33-1925.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Act No. 962, 46 Stat. at Large, 2316 (1950).
229 S.C. 1, 91 S.R. 2d 548 (1955).
XLVIII Stat. at Large, 1468 (Feb. 1954).
228 S.C. 448, 90 S.E. 2d 635 (1955).
227 S.C. 168, 87 S.E. 2d'583 (1955).
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was urged to construe creates a supersedus of thirty days only on an
appeal from an award made by the Industrial Commission. The
court, while specifically recognizing that the statute had the effect of

creating a privileged suitor, held that such privileged suitor was created in unambiguous phraseology and, in addition, was consistent
with legislative policy in the Workmen's Compensation field.
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